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This paper analyses the determinants of public attitudes to the “free movement” of workers 
in the European Union. We add to the small but growing research literature on this issue by 
focusing on how the characteristics of national welfare institutions affect public attitudes to 
intra-EU labour mobility. More specifically, we explore the role of what we see as the 
degree of “institutional reciprocity” in national systems of social protection in explaining 
variations of attitudes to free movement across 12 EU Member States. We do not find 
evidence of a direct effect of institutional reciprocity on attitudes to free movement. 
However, we identify an interaction effect which suggests that higher degrees of 
institutional reciprocity in national social protection systems in general, and in 
unemployment insurance systems in particular, are associated with lower levels of 
opposition to free movement among unemployed people.   
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The free movement of workers has in recent years become a highly contested issue in the 
European Union (EU), generating political debates and conflicts both between and within EU 
Member States (cf. Ruhs and Palme 2018; Roos 2018). Under the current rules surrounding 
free movement,  EU citizens can move and take up employment in any other EU country 
and – as long as they are “workers” – enjoy full and equal access to the host country’s 
welfare state. This means that EU Member States have an obligation to give migrant 
workers from other EU countries unrestricted access to their national labour markets and 
full access to their social protection systems, treating them equally with national workers.  
The political leaders of a number of EU Member States have in recent years called for 
changes to the rules for free movement. The United Kingdom, where free movement played 
a major role in the referendum vote to leave the EU (cf. Hobolt 2016; Goodwin and Milazzo 
2017) has been the only EU country that has proposed restricting the free movement of 
workers as such (Cameron 2013). There have, however, been other leaders of EU Member 
States (including in Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, and the UK, cf. Ruhs and Palme 
2018)  who have called for more restricted access for EU workers to national welfare states. 
The political leaderships of many other EU countries appear to have been opposed to 
fundamental and permanent reform of the current rules, directly or indirectly supporting 
the view that the current policy of unrestricted access to labour markets and full and equal 
access to welfare states for EU workers should continue. 
Views about free movement have not only varied between political leaders but also among 
the public in and across different EU Member States. The populations of EU countries differ 
in their support of and opposition to free movement (e.g. Blinder and Markaki 2018a; Lutz 
et al. 2018), but the differences appear to be partly dependent on how the survey questions 
are phrased and while opposition has declined in most countries there are no clear signs of 
convergence (Mårtensson and Uba 2018).  Recent research has shown that attitudes to free 
movement differ depending on whether it is about inward or outward mobility (e.g. Lutz 
2019), where respondents tend be more positive to hypothetical outward mobility than to 




differences in the public attitudes to free movement, also among the countries that are 
typically net-receiving countries of EU-workers (Mårtensson and Uba 2018).   
How can we explain these variations in public attitudes to free movement across EU 
countries? The large research literature on the determinants of attitudes to immigration (in 
general) has shown that attitudes are affected by both individual factors and a range of 
contextual factors such as local socio-economic conditions (e.g. Markaki and Longhi 2013; 
Hoxhaj and Zuccotti 2019), ethnic concentration (e.g. Weber 2015),  and prevailing 
institutions including welfare systems (e.g. Facchini and Mayda 2009). The emerging and still 
much smaller research literature on attitudes toward European free movement in particular 
has also found that socio-economic context matters (e.g. GDP per capita, see Vasilopoulou 
and Talving 2018), but it has not yet investigated the role of institutional factors in 
explaining cross-country variations in people’s attitudes to intra-EU labour mobility and to 
whether EU migrants should be able to access welfare benefits. This paper aims to start 
filling this gap by exploring the relevance of reciprocity in social protection systems, a factor, 
which in relation to normative attitudes to how social protection systems should be 
designed (Mårtensson, Palme and Ruhs 2019) as well as to public attitudes about how to 
give migrants rights to benefits (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012) stands out as being of 
significant importance.           
The aim of the paper is to explore whether and how public attitudes to free movement  
relate to the level of reciprocity embodied in national social protection (or insurance) 
systems – that is, the degree to which there is a reciprocal relationship between the insured 
person and “the system” based on the contributiveness and/or earnings-relatedness of the 
social insurance. We call this “institutional reciprocity”. The paper analyses how the 
institutional reciprocity of social protection systems is related to attitudes to free 
movement in 12 EU countries that are net-receivers of EU migrants. Our primary source of 
data on attitudes toward free movement is the European Social Survey (ESS). We also use a 
range of other sources to construct our indicator of institutional reciprocity and some of the 
control variables used in the analysis.      
The results of our analysis in this paper do not provide evidence that the institutional 




However, we find a conditional effect of reciprocity on attitudes towards free movement 
among the unemployed. This effect suggests that higher degrees of institutional reciprocity 
in national social protection systems are associated with lower levels of opposition to free 
movement among unemployed people.  
2. Theorising the link between reciprocity in welfare institutions and attitudes to 
free movement 
In any study of public attitudes to immigrants, or specific sub-groups of immigrants, it is 
important to ask who the public is likely to “have in mind” when answering survey questions 
about that group (Blinder 2015). This paper focuses on the intra-EU labour mobility of “EU 
workers”, i.e. EU citizens who have left their home country to work in another EU Member 
State. EU workers make up the vast majority of EU citizens who move from one EU country 
to another. However, it is important to emphasise that free movement may also include, 
and may in some people’s minds be associated with, the intra-EU mobility of other groups 
of EU citizens, such as family members of EU workers, pensioners, students or beggars. Non-
EU citizens with permanent residence status (including some recognised refugees) and/or 
naturalised EU citizens also benefit from free movement. Under EU regulations, the 
employment and welfare rights of some of these groups differ from those of “workers”. 
There may, nevertheless, be some “spill-over effects” when it comes to public attitudes to 
free movement which may relate to a range of different groups, not just workers.   
Migration and the welfare state  
There is a long-standing research literature that investigates the relationship between 
immigration and welfare states. Gary Freeman was one of the first to argue that large-scale 
immigration challenges the fiscal and political stability of the welfare state, concluding that 
“ … the relatively free movement of labour across national frontiers exposes the tension 
between closed welfare states and open economies and that, ultimately, national welfare 
states cannot coexist with the free movement of labour.” (Freeman 1986). One prominent 
off-shoot of this perspective has developed under the conceptual umbrella of “welfare state 
chauvinism” (Andersen and Bjørklund 1990), i.e. the idea that citizens in a country want to 




Welfare state chauvinism can be related to values, i.e., to ideas and norms about fairness or 
deservingness of welfare recipients. It can also stem from self-interest, i.e., from concerns 
about migrants being a burden on tax payers. Whatever its source, the general argument 
behind welfare state chauvinism is that workers in affluent parts of the world consider their 
welfare states to be threatened by migrants, and thus mobilise politically against both 
immigration and giving immigrants (“outsiders”) access to welfare benefits. Following this 
line of reasoning, we could expect that more generous welfare states generate more 
popular resistance to immigration and social rights for migrants simply because there is 
“more to lose”. There are, however, also other perspectives that predict the opposite, 
namely, that the most generous and universalistic welfare state will generate the most 
inclusive and tolerant attitudes to migrants (Crepaz and Damron 2009) and more admissive 
policies with regard to refugees (Boräng 2018). The positive effects of generous welfare 
states on immigration are interpreted as outcomes of processes whereby these more 
inclusive institutions generate inclusive norms vis-a-vis “outsiders”, including immigrants. 
This line of argument is similar to what has been observed about the relationships between 
different social policy regimes and the generosity towards poor people, that those living 
within more inclusive national social policy systems tend to be more generous towards “the 
poor”, which is part of what has been called the “paradox of redistribution” (cf. Korpi and 
Palme 1998).  
The role of welfare in institutions in explaining attitudes to immigration   
The empirical research literature on the determinants of public attitudes to immigration and 
the social rights of migrants has found some support for the idea that welfare institutions, 
and fiscal policies more generally, matter. A key finding that is relatively common across a 
range of different studies is that institutions often matter in interaction with labour markets 
and other individual characteristics. For example, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) 
analyse how fiscal policies influence voter attitudes to immigration across different US 
States. They find that what they call “high exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures” (mainly 
measures based on the different magnitude of welfare spending per person across states) 




Facchini and Mayda (2009) show that public attitudes to immigration in high-income 
countries are affected by the specific ways in which national welfare states adjust to an 
inflow of immigrants, distinguishing between a “tax adjustment model” and a “benefit 
adjustment model”. Their results suggest that the attitudes of high- and low-income 
individuals are affected differently by immigration across the two adjustment models.  
In a more recent paper that also highlights interaction effects, Huber and Oberdabernig 
(2016) analyse how the utilization of different types of welfare benefits by both immigrants 
and natives affects attitudes to immigration in twenty-four European countries. They find 
important interaction effects suggesting that the ways in which education and age shape 
attitudes to immigration depend on the take-up of benefits by immigrants relative to that of 
natives. Their results indicate that, in countries with higher benefit take-up rates by 
immigrants relative to natives, pro-immigration attitudes increase more strongly with 
increasing educational attainment and decline more strongly with the age of natives.    
Largely due to scarcity of relevant data, there are relatively few studies that analyse how 
welfare institutions are linked to attitudes regarding migrants’ access to the welfare state.   
Van der Waal, De Koster, and van Oorschot (2013) analyse how welfare chauvinism varies 
across different welfare regimes. Their results provide empirical support for the relevance of 
welfare regimes to such attitudes, although the regime effects they find can be fully 
attributed to regime differences in income inequality.     
Some studies have explored the role of normative attitudes to welfare, i.e. a type of 
informal institution, as a determinant of public attitudes to giving welfare rights to migrants. 
For example, in an important analysis that has partly inspired our paper, Reeskens and van 
Oorschot (2012) analyse the relationship between, on the one hand, normative attitudes to 
social protection systems among populations in 24 EU countries, and on the other the 
normative attitude they express in relation to how immigrants should be awarded benefits. 
They find that most Europeans prefer conditional access to welfare benefits for migrant 
workers, and that the most commonly held/preferred principle for regulating migrants’ 
access to social rights is “reciprocity” (defined by them as “prior contribution”). Reeskens 
and van Oorschot also find that people who believe that welfare benefits should be 




significantly more likely to support restrictions on the welfare benefits of newly arrived 
migrants. 
Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012) also consider the role of formal welfare institutions by 
analysing the effects of social protection expenditure. They find that high levels of social 
protection expenditure (as a share of GDP) tend to decrease welfare chauvinism, a result 
that is also found in a different study by Mewes and Mau (2013).1  
Considered as a whole, it is fair to say that the existing research on the role of welfare 
institutions in shaping public attitudes to immigration has identified some significant effects, 
but that the impacts identified are sometimes small and also depedent on methodological 
choices. While it is possible that this might reflect the fact that welfare institutions play a 
relatively minor role in shaping attitudes to immigration, it is also possible that it is the 
result of the well-known difficulties involved in measuring relevant institutions adequately, 
and because empirical models have been incorrectly specified in terms of how they affect 
public attitudes.  
Because of the considerable methodological challenges involved, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the available studies that explore the role of welfare institutions in shaping attitudes to 
immigration and access to social rights for migrants are still far fewer than the studies that 
focus on other explanatory factors. A much larger body of research has explored the role of 
labour market competition, i.e. the perceived consequences and “threats” of immigration 
for the wages and employment of citizens (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Despite a large 
number of studies on this particular issue, however, the evidence and empirical support for 
the idea that personal economic circumstances are a major driving force behind attitudes 
(especially negative attitudes) to immigration is still relatively weak. Instead, much of the 
existing research suggests that sociotropic concerns, especially about identity and the 
cultural impacts of migrants on the country as a whole, are the core drivers of negative 
attitudes towards immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).  
                                                     
1
 This finding would perhaps appear to contradict the results of Hanson et al. (2007) but that study was 




Explaining attitudes to free movement in the European Union  
The migration and welfare issues that arise in the context of the specific case of the free 
movement of workers in the European Union cut across many of the issues analysed in the 
broader literature on migration and the welfare state. These include the fiscal and other 
costs and benefits of  immigration; the costs and perceived fairness of granting migrants 
access to welfare benefits; competition in the labour market; perceived cultural issues and 
threats; as well as more specifically European themes such as ‘“social dumping”2 and the 
regulation of the rights of mobile EU-workers. This implies that our analyses of attitudes to 
free movement should be seen as an attempt to explore some questions with more 
precision than previous research in terms of dependent and independent variables, as well 
as in the selection of countries to analyse (see below). This notwithstanding, it will of course 
not be possible to provide full answers to the broader questions around migration and the 
welfare state. 
There are very few papers that have analysed the determinants of attitudes to free 
movement in the European Union. In the first paper on this specific issue, Vasilopoulou and 
Talving (2018) use data from the Eurobarometer to explore the role of both individual and 
contextual variables in shaping attitudes to free movement. They find that people’s support 
for free movement is strongly and negatively related to country affluence, measured by GDP 
per capita. Citizens in poorer EU Member States are more likely to support free movement. 
Importantly, and mirroring the findings of the role of some of the contextual/institutional 
factors analysed in the studies of attitudes to immigration reviewed above, the economic 
context (GDP per capita) also interacts with, and thus influences, the effects of other 
determinants such as human capital and identity.  Although Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018) 
include contextual factors such as GDP and Eurozone membership in their analysis, there is 
no explicit consideration or analysis of the role of welfare institutions.  
Lutz (2019) asks why over 80 percent of EU citizens are in favour of free movement when, at 
the same time, it has become a major driver of Euro-scepticism in many European countries. 
                                                     
2
 Whereby wages and social conditions deteriorate as a consequences of companies using the freedom of 




He explains this puzzle by highlighting the double-sided nature of free movement, which 
means that people can value their own rights to outward mobility without necessarily 
supporting the inward-mobility of citizens of other EU countries. The analyses in Lutz (2019) 
and  Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018)  suggest that attitudes to free movement very much 
depend on whether they are viewed primarily through an immigration or emigration lens.      
Two recent papers by Scott Blinder and Yvonni Markaki, prepared as part of the REMINDER 
project, explore different aspects of the perceived fiscal effects of immigration from within 
and outside the EU. Blinder and Markaki (2018) analyse how the perceived fiscal (and other) 
effects of EU and non-EU migrants are related to public attitudes to immigration. They find 
that EU citizens who think that immigrants have a negative fiscal impact on the welfare 
state are much more likely to support restrictions on immigration.  
In a related study, Blinder and Markaki (2019) raise and  explore the important question of 
what determines Europeans’ perceptions of the fiscal effects of immigration, from within 
and outside the EU. Their particular and novel focus is on whether and how the estimated 
fiscal effects of immigration (based on data from Nyman and Ahlskog 2018) are related to 
perceived effects. The study finds that perceptions of welfare effects are only weakly 
related to estimated material effects but identifies a larger significant relation to the 
number of working-age migrants receiving benefits compared to natives,  what the authors 
call the “demographic fiscal exposure to immigration”. The study finds that people who live 
in countries where more immigrants receive benefits relative to all natives have more 
negative perceptions of welfare impacts compared to people in countries with lower 
demographic fiscal exposure. The paper thus suggests that how many immigrants in relative 
terms receive benefits is a more important determinant of perceptions than how much each 
immigrant receives. The conclusion holds for the perceived effects of both EU migrants and 
non-EU migrants. The negative impact of demographic fiscal exposure to EU migrants is 
actually found to be larger than that of exposure to non-EU migrants. Thus, in different ways 
the existing research points to the importance of contextual and institutitonal factors for 
understanding the diffrences in views on free movement among European countries. But 




self-evident how welfare institutions are a significant determinant of attitudes to free 
movement. It is also clear that institutional effects are difficult to measure and analyse.  
Hypotheses about the relationship between institutional reciprocity and attitudes to free 
movement 
We consider the question of whether and how national institutions are related to, and 
shape, attitudes to free movement a very important area of research, not least in the 
context of highly contested policy debates about the causes of the apparent disagreements 
between people and political elites within and across EU countries, and about the 
implications for whether and how the current rules for free movement need to be 
reformed.    
In the following, we focus on the reciprocity of welfare institutions as a feature that may be 
of crucial importance for attitudes to free movement. A social protection system with a high 
degree of reciprocity is based on a strong link between an individual's payments to 
the welfare state and the benefits that he or she receives in return. Our previous work has 
explained how reciprocity in welfare institutions can influence policy attitude toward free 
movement (Ruhs and Palme 2018): there is a popular and widespread view across EU 
member states that “reciprocity” should be a guiding principle in the provision of welfare 
benefits for new migrants,3 which suggests that contributory or “merit” based entitlements 
appear to be more accepted as legitimate than benefits given on the basis of “need” or 
“universal rights” based on citizenship/residence (also see Reeskens and van 
Oorschot 2012).  
                                                     
3
 As shown in Appendix Table A1,  when asked at what point newcomers should get access to the same social 
benefits and services as citizens of the host country, the most common answer among respondents across 15 
European countries is “after having worked and paid taxes at least a year” (42 percent of respondents), 
followed by “once they have become a citizen” (29 percent). Only nine percent of respondents across 
countries said that newcomers should get access to the same social rights “immediately on arrival”, and only 




Different welfare systems can be expected to be associated with different underlying 
principles of benefit provision (e.g., contribution based, universal and needs based), with 
variable degrees of (in)consistency with the idea of reciprocity. Indeed, our previous work 
has shown that there are considerable variations across EU countries in terms of both the 
“institutional reciprocity” built into national social protection systems and people’s 
normative attitudes to reciprocity as a general principle of redistribution. We have also 
shown that there is a positive association between these two types of institutional and 
normative reciprocity (Martensson, Palme, and Ruhs 2019). We argue that these cross-
country differences in institutional (and normative) reciprocity of national welfare 
institutions may be an an important reason for variation in people’s (and political elites’) 
attitudes to the immigration and/or welfare rights of new EU migrants. 
Our understanding of reciprocity is built on the assumption that both the financing side and 
the benefits side may contribute to the reciprocity of a social protection system but that the 
link between the two sides is not necessarily very strong. The Beveridge system that was 
introduced in the United Kingdom after World War II was, for example, built on contributory 
financing where the insured person made a substantial contribution (originally flat rate and  
later earnings related) to the system. However, benefits were flat rate, and thus not 
necessarily determined by the size of the insured person’s contributions. Likewise, the old-
age pension system in The Netherlands is based on contributions from insured persons, but 
benefits are of a flat-rate character. We assume that the “contributiveness” of a system is 
especially strong if contributions are paid by the insured person her/himself. We therefore 
construct an index of contributiveness in the financing of the major social insurance 
programs. Reciprocity in a social protection system can also be fostered by relying on strong 
“earnings-relatedness”, i.e., the extent to which social insurance benefits replace previous 
earnings. The logic here is that earnings-relatedness supports the norm that that you “earn” 
your rights and those who have earned more also deserve higher benefits because they 
have contributed more to the system in the form of taxes and/or social security 
contributions. This is why we treat contributiveness and earnings-relatedness as at least 
partly separate aspects of the same underlying reciprocity factor. Through the mechanism 




support for giving migrant EU-workers access to the welfare state because their benefits will 
have to be “earned” and not just “received”.  
This theoretical reasoning results in the following hypothesis about the links between the 
degree of reciprocity built into a country’s welfare institutions and public attitudes to free 
movement: 
H1: The more institutional reciprocity in the  national social protection system, the lower the 
opposition to free movement.   
Considering the key findings of the existing research reviewed above, we are also interested 
in exploring if institutional reciprocity conditions attitudes to free movement differently for 
different groups within a country. More specifically, we follow a line of reasoning developed 
by Mewes and Mau (2009), wherein they identify the risks that globalization entails for 
lower economic strata in society. We argue that EU mobility is something that first and 
foremost challenges vulnerable groups in society and particularly those with a weak 
standing on the labour market and/or a dependence on the social insurance system as their 
main source of income. Being unemployed is a manifest form of vulnerability that may be 
associated with concerns that free movement leads to increased competition in the labor 
market. Moreover, a vast majority of the unemployed rely on social insurance as a main 
source of income. In this vulnerable group in particular, a high degree of institutional 
reciprocity may mitigate the perception of welfare policy as a struggle for scarce common 
resources where domestic and EU workers are pitted against one another. Reciprocity 
implies that social benefits are “earned” by domestic and EU workers alike. Following this 
logic, we expect reciprocity to lower the resistance to free movement among the 
unemployed in the receiving countries. This reasoning underpins our second hypothesis: 
H2: The greater the institutional reciprocity in the national social protection system, the 
lower the opposition to free movement among unemployed people.  
In other words, we expect the degree of institutional reciprocity in a country’s social 
insurance system to condition attitudes to free movement among vulnerable groups, such 




3. Method, data and measures 
The analytical strategy that we pursue in this paper is guided by a number of observations. 
First, it is clear that the character of free movement differs between sending and receiving 
countries, as does its salience as a political issue (Vasilopoulou and Talving 2018). In 
“sending countries” (i.e. countries that experience net-emigration of EU and citizen 
workers), there is an ongoing discussion about the risks of “brain drain” and population 
decline. In receiving countries, by contrast, governments face demands to restrict EU 
workers’ access to the labour market and welfare state benefits. Prior cross-country and 
individual level analyses suggest that those who associate free movement with their own 
mobility (emigration) are more positive towards it, while those who associate it with the 
free movement of “others” (immigration) are more negative towards it (e.g. Lutz 2019). 
These contrasting experiences are likely to necessitate different explanatory models for 
attitudes in sending and receiving countries. Our focus in this paper is exclusively on the 
tensions that arise around free movement in receiving countries (i.e. countries that 
experience net-immigration of EU and citizen workers). What is more, attitudes to free 
movement within the EU and EFTA differ from attitudes to immigration from third countries 
(Mårtensson and Uba 2018). Against this background, we delimit our analysis to twelve EU 
and EFTA receiving countries for which we have high-quality data on attitudes to free 
movement specifically.  
 
Second, while we expect the institutional design of welfare states to matter for attitudes to 
free movement, we recognize the methodological challenges involved in capturing such 
institutional differences empirically. Most prior works in the field employ either indirect 
measures of institutional configurations, such as social expenditure (e.g. Vasilopoulou and 
Talving 2018), or broad welfare regime classifications (e.g. van der Waal et al. 2013) to 
represent the varying commitments that countries make to social welfare. In contrast to 
this, we use a “variables-based” approach which draws on institutional data developed in an 
earlier working paper for the REMINDER project (Palme and Ruhs 2018). In this earlier 
working paper we introduced a new database (the Social Protection in Europe Database, 
SPEUDA) and laid the ground for an analysis of both regime categories and a set of 




across nations and over time. Given our theoretical focus on the specific factor of 
reciprocity, we do not use a regime approach in our analysis. This is because aggregate 
welfare regimes are defined by many different aspects of their social policy programmes 
that go beyond the degree of reciprocity in benefit provision. The analysis in this paper thus 
relies on a variables-based approach focused specifically on the issue of institutional 
reciprocity, i.e., instead of broad regime groupings we include a numerical indicator.  
Table 1 provides an overview of the dependent and independent variables included in our 







Table 1. Dependent and independent variables 
Variable Year Min Max Mean SD N 
Dependent variable       
       
Opposition to free movement 2014 1 4 2.31 0.94 11 547 
       
Independent variables, country level       
       
Reciprocity in the social insurance system 
 
2010 0.31 0.73 0.54 0.13 12 
Reciprocity in unemployment insurance 
 
2010 0.28 0.77 0.50 0.15 12 
LME 
 
- 0 1 0.17 0.39 12 
CME 
 
- 0 1 0.67 0.49 12 
MME 
 
- 0 1 0.17 0.39 12 
Log GDP per capita 2010 1.12 2.20 1.59 0.27 12 
       
Independent variables, individual level       




2014 0 1 0.51 0.50 11 814 
Unemployed 
 
2014 0 1 0.06 0.23 69 223 
Low education 
 
2014 0 1 0.61 0.49 60 724 
Retired 
 
2014 0 1 0.25 0.43 69 223 
Gender 
 
2014 1 2 1.51 0.50 69 212 
Age 
 
2014 14 123 49.1 18.7 69 014 
Left-Right 
 
2014 0 10 5.03 2.09 64 106 
 
Dependent variable  
To measure public attitudes towards free movement, we rely on survey data from the 
immigration module of the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS). Our dependent variable, 
Opposition to free movement, is drawn from an ESS survey experiment that was designed to 
measure and compare normative attitudes to different types of immigration. In the 
experiment, the respondents were randomly assigned to answer one of the four items 
shown in Table 2. The questions ask to what extent workers from other countries should be 




worded, except in two regards: the skill level and country of origin of the migrant worker 
are set to vary systematically. The specific sending country mentioned to each respondent is 
that European or non-European country which sends the largest number of migrants to the 
respondent’s home country (see Mårtensson and Uba 2018, Table A.6 in the Appendix for a 
list of the selected reference countries). Together, the four items allow researchers to 
evaluate how opposition to immigration is conditioned by the type of sending country 
(European vs. non-European) and the migrants’ skill level (professionals vs. unskilled 
workers).  
 
Table 2. Survey experiment design in ESS 2014 
 European sending country 
 
Non-European sending country 
(not used in our analysis) 
Professionals 
 
Please tell me to what extent you 
think [country] should allow 
professionals from [poor European 
country providing largest number of 
migrants] to come to live in 
[country]?  
(N= 5 843) 
Please tell me to what extent you 
think [country] should allow 
professionals from [poor country 
outside Europe providing largest 
number of migrants] to come to live 
in [country]? 




Please tell me to what extent you 
think [country] should allow 
unskilled labourers from [poor 
European country providing largest 
number of migrants] to come to live 
in [country]? (N= 5 704) 
Please tell me to what extent you 
think [country] should allow 
unskilled labourers from [poor 
country outside Europe providing 
largest number of migrants] to 
come to live in [country]? 
(N= 5 713) 
Source: Adapted from Heath et al. (2014) 
 
In order to capture attitudes to free movement, we started out with the two items that 
measure attitudes to migrant workers coming from European countries. We then delimited 
our sample further, to the 12 receiving countries where the sending country referred to in 
the survey questions is an EU member state. Our variable Opposition to free movement was 
created by adding up responses to the two separate items that tap attitudes to the free 
movement of “professionals” and “unskilled workers” respectively. Like the original 
variables our aggregated variable has four values: 1 “Allow many to come and live here”; 2 




opposition to free movement, without regard to the skill level of the migrants. To be able to 
distinguish how attitudes to free movement are affected by perceptions of the migrants’ 
skill level, we also include an experimental dummy that we call Professionals. This variable 
takes on the value 1 if the respondent was assigned to the question that casts EU workers as 
“professionals” rather than “unskilled labourers.”  
 
Using the high quality questions in the ESS survey experiment is advantageous, because 
they are concrete, contextualized and relate to what free movement means in the real 
world. As noted by the researchers who designed the survey experiment, the questions 
avoid “vague and hard-to-interpret categories” (Heath et al. 2014). In the selected 
countries, the questions make the respondents consider specific target groups that are 
salient in relation to free movement (the largest group of EU workers present in their 
country). Moreover, they refer specifically to “professionals” and “labourers”, and thereby 
evoke the idea of labour mobility rather than other forms of immigration. Being concrete 
and avoiding fuzzy words brings the additional advantage that respondents can provide 
rather precise answers without being on top of the current EU regulations concerning free 
movement. In fact, recent Eurobarometer data suggests that many EU citizens lack such 
knowledge and would like to know more about their rights as EU citizens (see Mårtensson 
and Uba 2018, 39-40). The questions employed here nevertheless give the respondents a 
basic idea of what free movement entails.  
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the variation in attitudes to free movement across the 12 
countries in our sample, and displays attitudes to professionals and unskilled labourers 
separately. Attitudes towards the free movement of professionals are consistently more 
positive than those towards the free movement of unskilled workers, across the whole 





Figure 1. Opposition to the free movement of labourers and professionals in 12 EU and EFTA 
receiving countries, 2014 
Note: Countries are sorted by mean preference in 2014.  
Source: European Social Survey 2014 
Germany, Norway and Sweden top the list of countries that support the free movement of 
professionals and unskilled workers alike, whereas Spain is most opposed (also in relation to 
both categories of EU workers). Save for Finland, the same groups of countries can be found 
above and below the mean in the top panel (unskilled labourers) and bottom panel 
(professionals) in Figure 1, indicating that some receiving countries are consistently more 
supportive of the free movement scheme than others. 
Independent variables at the country level 
We construct and use an index to capture the degree of reciprocity in social insurance 
systems across the 12 countries in our sample. The index relates to both the financing side 
























































On the financing side, we have chosen to capture reciprocity by using the proportion of 
financing that formally comes from the insured person, with the other two contributors 
being the employers and the state (taxation). We have focused on the formal rules 
considering contributions from these three sources. The reason for not including the 
employer’s contribution is based on our understanding of reciprocity in terms of a visible 
connection between contributions and benefit entitlements. Arguably, in many cases 
employers’ contributions are seen as a tax that becomes part of the general revenue. The 
financing is measured for the following three social insurance programs separately: 
pensions, unemployment insurance, and sickness cash benefits. With few exceptions, work 
accident insurance programs are exclusively funded by employers’ contributions, which is 
why we did not include them in our analysis. We first calculated three variables expressing 
the proportion of financing by the insured person for pensions, sickness insurance, and 
unemployment insurance, respectively. We then calculated the Financing index as an 
average of the three programme-specific financing variables (pensions, sickness, and 
unemployment).  
On the benefit side, we use two different indicators for the following four social insurance 
programs: pensions, unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, and work accident 
insurance. The first indicator is the net replacement rate (social insurance benefit net of 
taxes divided by wage net of taxes) for what we have labelled a “full worker”, i.e. someone 
who fulfils all contribution requirements and earns an average wage. The second indicator is 
the replacement rate for the maximum benefits possible as a proportion of the average 
wage. We have applied a ceiling of 1.5 in order to avoid problems arising from outliers and 
influential cases caused by the fact that a few countries have very high ceilings for benefit 
purposes (or no ceiling at all). The benefit index was calculated in a stepwise procedure. We 
first take the mean of the two replacement variables by program. In a second step, we take 
the mean of the four program indices (pensions, unemployment, sickness, work accident) to 
attain the Benefits index. 
We then calculated a general Reciprocity index, calculated as an average of the Benefits 
index and the Financing index. We have used the same procedure to calculate a separate 




index (of the financing and benefits indices) is guided by our understanding of that 
reciprocity as about both contributiveness and earnings-relatedness. On the financing side 
we aim to measure the contributiveness. What we measure on the benefit side is the 
earnings-relatedness. Here it important to recognise that a social security system or 
program can be contributory without being earnings-related, and the other way around. We 
do not include employer contributions, meaning that the financing side is only capturing 
part of the contributiveness of the financing, but we do this in order to reflect the most 
visible part of the contributions. In addition, we want to avoid an overestimation of the 
contributiveness of social protection systems (notably in the Nordic countries) that rely 
almost exclusively on employers’ contributions where the difference to a (payroll) tax is not 
big. When it comes to the benefit side, the index captures two aspects of earnings-
relatedness. The full worker replacement measures the degree of earnings-relatedness, 
which is an important aspect of reciprocity, and the maximum benefits indicates how high 
up in the earnings distribution this principle applies. Hence, an additive approach also 
makes sense with this index.   
Figure 2 displays country-scores on the institutional reciprocity index, for the years 2010 
and 2015. Since we can expect a lagged effect of the institutional variables, we use the 2010 
scores because they precede the year (2014) when the dependent variables were 
measured. It can be noted that the country rankings are reasonably stable between 2010 
and 2015, with only a couple of changes in terms of rank ordering of countries. Higher 
scores indicate greater degrees of reciprocity. We focus our analysis of “institutional 
reciprocity” on welfare institutions in the 12 receiving countries for which we have data 
from the European Social Survey (ESS). Some countries score high on the financing 
dimension but not on the benefit dimension, whereas other countries score high on benefit 
dimension but not on the financing dimension. In other words, the empirical correlation 
between the two components in our reciprocity index is low (alpha=0.27). However, our 
motive for adding the two components is not based on the empirical correlation but on the 







Figure 2. Institutional reciprocity in the social insurance system generally, and 
unemployment benefits specifically, in 12 EU and EFTA receiving countries, 2010 and 2015 
Source: SPEUDA (Palme and Ruhs 2018) 
 
In addition to our main independent variable, we include two country-level control 
variables. Our dataset covers 12 out of the 15 EU receiving countries. Although this provides 
a satisfactory coverage of the available cases, it leaves us with a very small number of 
observations. We therefore strive to include a limited number of country-level control 
variables. Following Vasilopoulou and Talving (2018), we expect that the wealth of a country 
may influence both its choice  of welfare policy and public attitudes to immigration, and 
therefore include GDP per capita as our first control variable. Moreover, the countries in our 
sample exhibit important differences from a “varieties of capitalism” perspective. Liberal 
market economies have more fluid and accessible labour markets with lower levels of 
employment protection, whereas labour markets in coordinated market economies tend to 
invest in individual workers’ skills and provide higher levels of employment protection (Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2009). Such basic institutional differences stemming 
from the workings of the labour market appear likely to impact welfare state design as well 




variable at the country level. Following Hall and Gingerich (2009), we classify the United 
Kingdom and Ireland as Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland as Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs), and Spain and France as Mixed Market Economies (MMEs). MMEs constitute the 
reference category in our analysis. 
Independent variables at the individual level 
Our key independent variable at the individual level indicates whether the respondent self 
identify as unemployed or not, and is based on two items from the 2014 ESS. The first of 
these indicates if the respondent was unemployed and actively looking for a job in the last 
seven days. The second indicates if the respondent was unemployed, wanting a job, 
but not actively looking for a job – all in the past seven days. Combined into the new 
variable Unemployed, these items simply reflect if the respondents were unemployed or not 
over the past seven days (without any regard to job seeking activities). We also include a set 
of standard individual-level control variables (e.g. Vasilopoulou and Talving 2018), all taken 
from the ESS and reflecting the respondents’ Age, Gender and Left-Right placement, and if 
the respondent is Retired or has Low education. We consider Low education to be a central 
control variable because it is a much-used indicator of socioeconomic status; a factor 
that could be expected to affect individuals’ risk of being unemployed as well as their 
attitudes to free movement. It is constructed as a dummy variable where ”low education” 
indicates that the respondent’s highest level of education is primary or secondary 
education. In contrast, ”high education” indicates that the respondent’s highest level of 
education is post-secondary or tertiary education. 
Empirical model 
Our data imply some challenges for the specification of the empirical model. Our main 
constraint is that we have cross-sectional data for no more than 12 countries and therefore 
clearly limited variation at the macro-level. This means that we can only apply very few 
macro-level variables. A common model for data with a combination of country-level and 
individual-level variables is a multi-level model (also referred to as hierarchical model).  




Jenkins 2015) to issues of limited upper-level variation. Quite the opposite, multi-level 
models are vulnerable for a small number of upper-levels units, and using such models for 
fewer than 25-30 upper-level units is likely to result in unreliable and biased estimates 
(Bryan and Jenkins 2015).  This is particularly the case with more complex models including 
cross-level interactions. Exploring such interactions is one of our central aims in this paper. 
In addition, with as few as 12 upper-level observations it is effectively not possible to 
include a sufficient number of upper-level variables to adequately model the macro-level 
variation to avoid the risk of omitted variable bias (Möhring 2012). 
Against this backdrop we have chosen another method, using standard OLS with country 
fixed effects in our more rigid specifications. To account for the clustered nature of our data 
we apply country-clustered robust standard errors.4 Country fixed effects absorb all of the 
average differences in the dependent variable across countries and lessen issues of omitted 
variables bias on the country-level (Brunello and Checci 2007). Such models therefore offer 
an attractive alternative for the study of cross-level interactions where limited upper-level 
variation makes the use of multi-level models less attractive (Möhring 2012). However, 
applying country fixed effects means that it is impossible to estimate any direct effects of 
institutions since there is no macro-level variation left. We therefore also include some 
models without country fixed effects to allow an exploration of the role of country-level 
institutions but these models should be interpreted cautiously considering the small 
number of countries and limited number of country-level controls. 
4. Results and discussion  
The following sections evaluate our hypotheses. We start by assessing if reciprocity in the 
social insurance system at large (i.e. general reciprocity) is associated with less opposition to 
free movement in our sample of 12 receiving countries. Motivated by our second 
hypothesis, we then move on to consider if general reciprocity is associated with less 
opposition to free movement among the unemployed.  Finally, we turn our attention to the 
                                                     
I
 Analysing only 12 countries (clusters) could also be an issue for the application of clustered robust standard 
errors (Angrist and PIschke 2009), although this depends on the characteristics of the data (Cameron et al. 
2015). We calculate the degrees of freedom for the T-distribution as the number of countries (clusters) minus 




role of reciprocity in unemployment insurance. Does reciprocity in unemployment insurance 
matter for attitudes to free movement among the public at large, and/or among the 
unemployed? 
General reciprocity and attitudes to free movement 
The scatter plot in Figure 3 provides a basic indication of the bivariate relationship between 
general reciprocity and attitudes to free movement across our 12 receiving countries. While 
the fitted line suggests that there is a weak negative relationship between general 
reciprocity and opposition to free movement, the coefficient estimate is very small and lacks 
statistical significance. Motivated by our theoretical reasoning and expectations, we will 
continue with a more in-depth assessment of the role that country- and individual-level 
factors might play in attitudes to free movement. 
 
Figure 3. General reciprocity and opposition to free movement in 12 receiving countries, 
2010/2014 
 
Our regression results in Table 3 allow a more thorough consideration of how reciprocity in 




table include the experimental dummy Professionals that indicates if a respondent 
answered the item that casts EU workers as “professionals” as opposed to “unskilled 
labourers”. Since the dependent variable represents opposition towards free movement, 
positive effects imply an increase in opposition towards free movement whereas negative 
effects imply a decrease in opposition towards free movement.  
Our first model (Model 1) only includes two independent variables; the country-level 
variable Reciprocity and the experimental dummy Professionals. In this specification, the 
effect of reciprocity is negative, which is in line with our expectations in H1, but it is far from 
statistically significant. The coefficient estimate for the Professionals dummy is larger, 
negative and clearly significant at the 99 percent level, confirming that there is less 




Table 3. Regression analysis of opposition to free movement in 12 EU and EFTA receiving 
countries on institutional reciprocity etc., 2014 
















Country level         
         
Reciprocity -0.19 0.74 0.76 0.69 0.66  0.22  



























         
Log GDP per capita  -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.35  -0.35  
  (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29)  (0.29)  
LME  0.29 0.29 0.31 0.28  0.28  
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22)  (0.22)  
CME  -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05  -0.05  
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.25)  
Individual level         
















  (0.05) (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) 











    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) 
Retired    -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.05 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.20) (0.19) 






 -0.03 -0.01 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) 
Age    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 




 0.03 0.03 
     (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Cross-level interactions         
         
Reciprocity * Unemployed   -0.26 -0.29 -0.34 -0.41
*
 -0.34 -0.43 
   (0.34) (0.32) (0.28) (0.22) (0.31) (0.25) 
Reciprocity * Low education       -0.02 -0.04 
       (0.18) (0.18) 
Reciprocity * Retired       -0.20 -0.14 
       (0.33) (0.31) 
Reciprocity * Gender       0.15 0.11 
       (0.14) (0.14) 
Reciprocity * Age       0.00 -0.00 
       (0.01) (0.01) 
Reciprocity * Left-Right       0.04 0.02 


















 (0.21) (0.52) (0.52) (0.47) (0.46) (0.09) (0.54) (0.09) 
Adj. R2 0.098 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.22 
Observations 11547 11547 11547 11446 10640 10640 10640 10640 
Country FEs No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***





In the second column (Model 2) we add our country-level controls and our main explanatory 
variable at the individual level, Unemployed. Contrary to our expectations in H1, the effect 
of reciprocity becomes positive (and somewhat more sizable), but it remains statistically 
insignificant. At the individual level, the unemployed are more sceptical towards free 
movement, and this relationship is significant at the 95 percent level. The following model 
(Model 3) then adds an interaction between unemployment and reciprocity, to explore how 
reciprocity conditions the effect of unemployment on attitudes to free movement. In line 
with our expectations in H2, we find that reciprocity mitigates opposition to free movement 
among the unemployed, as indicated by the negative coefficient estimate of the interaction 
term. In other words, the unemployed are less opposed to free movement in countries 
where there is a higher degree of reciprocity in the social protection system. The coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term is not significant, but it is important to keep in mind that 
the significance of interaction effects should not only be assessed on the basis of the 
coefficient alone (Brambor et al. 2005). Further below, we complement the regression 
results with a marginal effects plot to facilitate interpretation. 
Next, we add a set of individual-level controls for level of education, retirement, gender and 
age (in Model 4) and, in a following step, a control for left-right placement, where higher 
values imply that the respondent is more oriented to the right of the political spectrum 
(Model 5). We find that those with lower education, females and those leaning to the right 
are significantly more opposed to free movement. However, the effects of our main 
independent variables – Reciprocity, Unemployed and the interaction between the two – are 
not substantially affected by these additional variables. If anything, the interaction 
coefficient becomes slightly larger and somewhat more precise, but it is still below 
conventional levels of statistical significance. 
The following model (Model 6) uses country fixed effects. These absorb all average cross-
country differences related to the country-level variables included in our previous models, 
as well as any other country-level variables that are not included. This entails that the 
coefficients for the country-level variables no longer can be estimated. At the same time, 
the fixed effects model represents a stricter robustness test of the coefficient estimate of 




results suggest support for our second hypothesis (H2), which states that a greater degree 
of reciprocity in the overall social protection system should lower the opposition to free 
movement among unemployed people. The coefficient estimate for the interaction 
between reciprocity and unemployment becomes slightly larger than in the previous 
models, and is statistically significant at the 90 percent level.  
Finally, the two last columns (Model 7 and 8) are devoted to testing whether the cross-level 
interaction between unemployment and reciprocity is sensitive to the addition of controls 
at the interaction level. In these models, we thus interact reciprocity with all of the other 
individual-level controls, with and without country-fixed effects. That way, we are able to 
explore whether the conditional effect of reciprocity on the impact of unemployment could 
be a result of a relationship on the interaction-level with any of these controls. Reassuringly, 
the point estimate of the interaction coefficient is barely affected by this addition. However, 
adding a number of interactions with the same macro-level variable really puts a strain on 
the available variation. The estimates therefore become imprecise and statistically 
insignificant. The fixed effects in Model 8 have a similar effect on the interaction between 
reciprocity and unemployment as in Model 6, resulting in a somewhat larger coefficient, if 
still insignificant. 
A closer look at our main result is offered in the marginal effects plot presented in Figure 4. 
Based on our final regression model (Model 8) the plot highlights our findings in relation to 
H2. The negative slope shows that being unemployed has a more negative effect on 
individuals’ attitudes to free movement in contexts where there is a lower degree of 
reciprocity in the social insurance system. In our sample of countries, the degree of 
reciprocity is lowest in Ireland (0.31), the UK (0.35) and Denmark (0.36), whereas it is 
highest in the Netherlands (0.73), Switzerland (0.73) and Finland (0.65). In a minimally 
reciprocal country such as Ireland, being unemployed is quite strongly associated with 
opposition to free movement (the point estimate for the effect of unemployment would 
equal 0.23, significant at the 99 percent level). In a maximally reciprocal context such as the 
Netherlands or Switzerland, in contrast, unemployment has no significant effect on 





Figure 4. Marginal effects being unemployed on attitudes to free movement, at different 
levels of general reciprocity 
 
This result supports H2 and our reasoning that reciprocity may work against the perception 
of welfare policy as an area where natives and EU workers are pitted against one another in 
a struggle for societal resources. While the unemployed on average are more opposed to 
free movement, they appear to perceive EU workers as less of a threat in countries where 
social benefits have to be “earned” by natives and EU workers alike. 
Reciprocity in unemployment insurance and attitudes to free movement 
Our finding that unemployed individuals are more opposed to free movement in low-
reciprocity contexts warrants some further investigation. In line with our previous reasoning 
in relation to H2, economically vulnerable groups such as the unemployed are more likely to 
perceive EU workers as a threat in low-reciprocity contexts where social rights are 
“received” rather than “earned” by natives and EU citizens alike. It is conceivable, 
moreover, that the design of unemployment insurance will be especially salient for the 
unemployed, as it is their current source of income. To explore this idea empirically, we shift 




reciprocity in unemployment insurance specifically. With such a specification, we could 
expect a greater impact on attitudes to free movement among the unemployed specifically. 
On the other hand, unemployment insurance is a key aspect of the social protection system, 
with high political salience among the entire working population, and could influence 
attitudes in society at large. Will a greater degree of reciprocity in unemployment insurance 
alone make a difference for attitudes to free movement, and if so, for whom and how? 
Table 4 presents the results from a regression analysis where the main independent variable 
is reciprocity in the unemployment insurance, Reciprocity_ue, rather than general 
reciprocity. In all other respects, the model specifications in Table 4 remain identical to 
those in Table 3. Starting out with the bivariate relationship between Reciprocity_ue and 
attitudes to free movement in the first column (Model 1), we note that the effect of 
reciprocity in unemployment insurance on attitudes to free movement is quite large, 
negative and statistically significant at the 90 percent level. This alternative specification 
thus lends support to H1, which states that reciprocity in the social protection system is 
likely to be associated with less opposition to free movement among the population at 
large. As in the previous analysis, the coefficient estimate for the Professionals dummy is 
negative and clearly significant at the 99 percent level. 
Adding our country-level controls and the key individual-level variable Unemployed in 
Model 2, the effect of Reciprocity_ue remains negative in line with our expectations in H1, 
but becomes smaller and loses its statistical significance. Like our previous analysis, this 
model also indicates that the unemployed are more opposed to free movement at the 
individual level; the coefficient estimate for Unemployed is statistically significant at the 99 
percent level.  
To explore if reciprocity conditions the effect of unemployment on attitudes to free 
movement, the following column (Model 3) then adds the interaction between Unemployed 
and Reciprocity_ue. As in the case of general reciprocity, we find that reciprocity in the 
unemployment insurance is associated with less opposition to free movement among the 




Table 4. Regression analysis of opposition to free movement on institutional reciprocity in 

















Country level         
         
Reciprocity_ue -0.59
*
 -0.21 -0.19 -0.23 -0.25  -0.20  



























         
Log GDP per capita  -0.30 -0.30 -0.28 -0.31  -0.31  
  (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30)  (0.30)  
LME  0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05  0.05  
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22)  (0.22)  
CME  -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06  -0.06  
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24)  (0.24)  
Individual level         
















  (0.05) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 











    (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) 
Retired    -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) 






 0.07 0.07 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) 
Age    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 







     (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Cross-level interactions         
         
Reciprocity_ue * 
Unemployed 















         
Reciprocity_ue * Low educ.       -0.05 -0.01 
       (0.13) (0.12) 
Reciprocity_ue * Retired       -0.07 -0.04 
       (0.18) (0.18) 
Reciprocity_ue * Gender       -0.02 -0.03 
       (0.15) (0.15) 
Reciprocity_ue * Age       -0.00 -0.01 
       (0.01) (0.01) 
Reciprocity_ue * Left-Right       0.05 0.02 


















 (0.15) (0.42) (0.42) (0.33) (0.34) (0.09) (0.33) (0.09) 
Adj. R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.22 
Observations 11547 11547 11547 11446 10640 10640 10640 10640 
Country FEs No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***





Introducing individual-level controls (in Model 4) and a control for left-right placement (in 
Model 5), we find that those with lower education are significantly more opposed to free 
movement, as are females and those leaning towards the political right. These findings 
closely mirror those in Table 3. More importantly, the effects of our main independent 
variables – Reciprocity_ue, Unemployed and the interaction between the two – changes 
with the addition of these variables. In model 5, the coefficient estimate of the interaction 
between Reciprocity_ue and unemployment grows larger and gains statistical significance at 
the 90 percent level. This suggests that left-right placement previously acted as a suppressor 
variable that held back the negative reciprocity-related effect of unemployment on 
opposition to free movement.  
Finally, the three last columns (Model 6-8) allow us to assess whether the cross-level 
interaction between unemployment and Reciprocity_ue is sensitive to the addition of 
controls at the interaction level. By adding country-fixed effects, Model 6 and Model 8 also 
subject the cross-level interaction between unemployment and Reciprocity_ue to a tougher 
test than the previous models. Just adding country fixed effects in Model 6 makes the 
interaction coefficient somewhat smaller than in the previous models, and it falls below 
statistical significance. In contrast to this, the two last models (Model 7 and 8) that include 
all control variables at the interaction level indicate support for our second hypothesis, H2. 
Adding the controls at the interaction-level boosts the size of the interaction between 
reciprocity and unemployment, supporting the hypothesis that reciprocity conditions the 
effect of unemployment on attitudes to free movement. In summary, we cannot 
substantiate that reciprocity in unemployment insurance affects attitudes to free 
movement among the general population. However, among those that are most 
exposed/vulnerable to the workings of the unemployment insurance – i.e. the unemployed 
– reciprocity in this specific part of the social protection system significantly lowers the 
opposition to free movement. 
We examine this main result more closely in the marginal effects plot presented in Figure 5. 
The plot highlights our findings in relation to H2, based on our final regression model in 
Table 4 (Model 8). It shows that being unemployed has a quite substantial effect on 




unemployment insurance is low. In our sample, the degree of reciprocity in the 
unemployment  insurance is lowest in the UK (0.28) and Ireland (0.29), whereas it is highest 
in Switzerland (0.77) and France (0.72). Being unemployed is quite strongly associated with 
opposition to free movement in a minimally reciprocal country such as the UK, (the point 
estimate equals 0.21, significant at the 99 percent level). By contrast, unemployment has no 
significant effect on attitudes to free movement in a maximally reciprocal context such as 
Switzerland (effect equals 0.04, not statistically significant). 
 
 
Figure 5. Marginal effects of being unemployed on opposition to free movement at different 
levels of reciprocity in the unemployment insurance system 
 
Taken together, our findings from the second regression analysis lend further support to our 
second hypothesis, H2, which states that a greater degree of reciprocity in the social 
protection system will lower the opposition to free movement among unemployed people. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that the design of a country’s unemployment insurance 
scheme – in and of itself – plays an important role in the readiness of the unemployed to 





For those who see large-scale migration and the sustainability of national welfare states as 
incompatible, the political tensions around free movement and equal rights for migrant EU-
workers should come as no surprise. However, the fact that opposition to free movement 
varies significantly across  EU Member States, also among those who are net receivers of EU 
workers, raises important questions about the conditions under which unrestricted in-ward 
mobility and/or equal access to welfare benefits for EU workers are seen as problematic. In 
particular, is important to ask whether and how the institutional characteristics of national 
welfare states affect public attitudes to immigration and/or to giving migrants access to 
welfare benefits.     
As we discussed in this paper, comparative research on migration, welfare states, and public 
attitudes indicates complex relationships between these phenomena, and the results of 
existing studies seem to be at least partly contradictory. The mixed findings of current 
research warrant more elaborate analyses of the relationships between welfare states and 
public attitudes to immigration. The aim of this paper has been to make a contribution in 
this area by exploring whether opposition to free movement in the EU is related to the 
degree of institutional reciprocity of national social protection systems. Our expectation was 
that higher degrees of reciprocity in social protection systems would serve as a protective 
factor in relation to opposition to free movement, simply because all benefits claimants, 
including migrants, would be seen as more legitimate and deserving in such systems. 
In our analyses of ESS data for 12 EU countries that are net-receivers of EU migrants, we 
find no significant direct effect of reciprocity in welfare institutions on opposition to free 
movement. This finding applies to institutional reciprocity in both, national social protection 
systems in general and national unemployment insurance systems in particular. However, 
we find a significant interaction effect between the reciprocity of the national social 
protection systems and the employment status of the respondents, both for general 
reciprocity and for unemployment insurance reciprocity.  Our results suggest that in 
countries where the social protection systems in general, or the unemployment insurance 
systems specifically, are based on higher degrees of reciprocity, people who are 




The novel contribution of the paper is that it says something new about how welfare state 
institutions may interact with labour market vulnerabilities of workers, in our case 
unemployment. Our results can be seen in the perspective of recent findings where 
opposition to migration via support of radical right parties has been explained by the 
vulnerabilities created by globalization and automation for some groups in society but 
where social protection systems also appear to play a conditioning role (Dal Bo et al. 2018; 
Gingrich 2019; Im et al. 2019). 
How does the interaction between institutional reciprocity on social protecton systems  and 
labour market vulnerability matter for the national politics around free movement in 
different EU Member States? This is one of the questions that will be explored in our next 
paper within Work Package 7 of the REMINDER project. The present paper is a stepping 
stone in our larger project about the tensions between national institutions and the politics 
of free movement in the European Union. The analysis we have conducted in this paper 
paves the way for future analyses of the relationships between public attitudes to free 
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Table A1. Public attitudes regarding the point at which new migrants should get access to the same 
rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living in the country (see precise survey 
question in note below table), 2016  
 
































AT   7.8 9.6 38.2 24.6 15.0 1.3 3.6 0.0 100.0 
BE  12.1 10.4 50.3 21.1 5.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 100.0 
CH  9.3 12.9 51.9 18.8 3.3 0.8 3.1 0.0 100.0 
CZ  4.9 3.7 31.5 33.5 22.8 0.3 3.4 0.0 100.0 
DE  11.6 13.6 48.6 22.6 2.0 0.4 1.1 0.0 100.0 
EE  5.8 5.3 47.1 33.9 6.5 0.1 1.3 0.0 100.0 
FI  5.9 15.0 33.6 41.2 2.5 0.1 1.7 0.0 100.0 
FR  11.2 10.7 49.1 19.7 6.8 0.4 2.2 0.0 100.0 
GB  4.9 7.7 56.6 21.2 6.4 0.5 2.7 0.0 100.0 
IE  8.6 15.0 48.3 19.4 5.8 0.6 2.4 0.0 100.0 
IS  16.4 19.0 40.7 19.8 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.1 100.0 
NL  7.4 8.3 32.7 46.7 2.4 0.1 2.4 0.0 100.0 
NO  12.1 14.4 36.3 33.1 1.7 0.1 2.4 0.0 100.0 
PL  3.7 4.8 37.4 38.2 7.3 0.3 8.1 0.2 100.0 
SE  17.2 17.7 31.4 27.1 0.9 0.3 5.4 0.0 100.0 
SI  4.1 7.7 33.1 44.5 7.4 0.2 3.0 0.1 100.0 
Total*  8.9 11.0 41.7 29.1 6.1 0.4 2.8 0.0 100.0 
 
Notes: Question posed (“imsclbn”): “Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other 
countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as 
citizens already living here?” Responses were coded on the scale 1 “Immediately on arrival”; 2 “After 
a year, whether or not have worked”; 3 “After worked and paid taxes at least a year”; 4 “Once they 
have become a citizen”; 5 “They should never get the same rights.” Design weights (dweight) were 
applied in the calculations. *Total refers to the between-country mean. 
 
Source: European Social Survey 2016 and own calculations. 
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